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SCIENTIFIC OBJECTIVITY AND FRAMEWORK TRANSPOSITIONS

PATRICK A HEELAN

I. The classical notion of scientific objectivity
The classical notion of scientific objectivity is a property of oppositional
truth. It is the property of being open to testing by inspection, in principle, by
all men, although in practice perhaps, the testing of a scientific claim is
restricted to the members of a community of professional experts. It is,
moreover, the property of being stable in time, true eternally as it were; for
objective truth is thought to express what is so independently of human interests,
initiatives, bias, social circumstances and historical environment. Often there is
the added connotation that what is is pictured not in its relationship to man, but
absolutely, as it re, in itself, or in its relations to the rest of nature, where
nature taken to have an essence independently of the meaning conferred on
nature by Dasein. All this is expressed as truth-invariance relative to
synchronous communities of knowers (living at one time epoch) whether
sympatric or allopatric (whether living in one country or in different
countries): truth-invariance relative to allochronous communities of
knowers (living at different time epochs), and truth-invariance relative to the
physical transformations and substitutions which define the objective content
of a scientific law or theory.
II. The crisis of scientific objectivity
Truth-invariance relative to synchronous communities of knowers in all
countries of the world seems to be one of the striking facts about science that
distinguishes it from common sense or even from philosophy. Science is
international, cosmopolitan and has, it is claimed, but one language. So
pervasive is this belief about the one language of science that it might seem to be
almost part of what we mean by the scientific enterprise, and it was indeed a part
of the classical philosophy of Newton, Descartes and Kant which supported the
scientific enterprise in the first three hundred years of its existence. We raise the
question then: is the truth-invariance of science relative to contemporary living
communities of knowers, merely a synthetic empirical claim, or do we in fact,
for whatever reason, dignify with the name of science only those claims
1
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which are truth-invariant in this way?
One answer to this question emerges from the consideration of the
scientific enterprise as an ongoing historical enterprise. The objective content
of scientific theories has changed in the course of time: one theory has
replaced another. The new theory, as Butterfield, Conant, Kuhn, Agassi,
Feyerabend and others have pointed out, is often inconsistent with the old :
Newton 's laws of motion with Kepler's or Galileo's, statistical
thermodynamics with classical thermodynamics, relativity mechanics with
Newtonian mechanics etc. Scientific theories then are not truth-invariant
relative to allochronous human communities. There must then be times of
crisis in science when two rival theories are in competition, and when truthinvariance relative to synchronous human communities is abrogated, at least
for a while. Let us imagine the pace of scientific investigation accelerated so
that a scientific theory would be no sooner accepted than it is challenged by a
rival. Under these circumstances towards which we are rapidly moving, even
truth-invariance relative to synchronous human communities would
disappear. Whatever science is, then, if its future is like its past, the fact that
it claims the universal allegiance of the human community and seems for the
most part at this moment to vindicate its claim, cannot be attributed to the
structure of the scientific enterprise, but constitutes a synthetic empirical fact
which may well be destined to disappear. To a Popperian, so much the better:
every theory must continually be challenged, for without this challenge a
scientific theory would become a dogmatic metaphysics lacking an adequate
empirical warrant for its continued truth-acceptance.
III. Meeting the crisis of scientific objectivity
This challenge to the objectivity of the scientific enterprise can be met in a
variety of ways: (1) By the claim that there is a basic set of scientific facts
(usually called observational facts) which remain invariant under changing
theoretical interpretation. This often goes with (2) the claim that scientific
theories have merely an instrumentalistic value; they do not picture the world as
it is, their role being purely formal, or cybernetic, or calculational, or the source
of rules for processing scientific and irreformable data. (3) Another more serious
claim, that for example of W Sellars', looks on the scientific enterprise as at any
moment of time tentative and pro-visional but en route towards the goal of the
perfect objective scientific description of the world, the Peircean scientific
framework, which alone is or will be definitive science. In this view, the
direction the scientific enterprise takes is that of replacing the manifest
framework of common sense treated as phenomenal by a more and more
adequate scientific framework in which alone ultimately will be expressed
the only true description of the world.
2
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I propose to take up and consider in turn all of these strategies, some
briefly, others at more length.
IV. The Myth of the Given
That there is a basic set of observational scientific facts invariant under
changing theoretical interpretation has been challenged by many writers,
among them Butterfield, Conant, Kuhn, Agassi, Feyerabend, Sellars and
Nartofsky. 2 The argument is that meanings are the product of human
conventions. They are not imprinted by events or produced by habits of
behavior whether instinctual or acquired by conditioning. Meanings, of
course, arise within a human pattern of life and they are in turn verified in
events belonging to a human pattern of life. But to claim that the word ` cat '
has a certain meaning, is to claim that people agree to consider cats as
unities of a particular kind entering into experience and that the word ` cat '
has been chosen to designate this kind of unity in human experience. Even
observational language then is theory-laden. This implies the negative claim
that there is no given primordial core to human experience the description
of which provides the basic conceptual framework to which all other
conceptual frame-works are reduced logically or epistemologically.
The reason for this rejection of any primordial given is that there is no
experience which is not an experience of a certain kind and that, consequently,
the descriptive framework antecedes the possession of the experience. There is,
of course, a pre-experience, whether playing the role of myth or that of an
inquisitive but not yet structured awareness. A variety of terms have been used
for this pre-experience: the tacit dimension underlying a problem, the known
unknown, the heuristic anticipation of the conceptual framework to be generated
by insight and formulation. Whatever these are, they do not generate of
themselves unique and irreformable sets of concepts. This is not to say that a
conceptual framework is arbitrary. It is necessarily conditioned by habits
instinctual and acquired and by the structure of the environment. But it is not
uniquely specified by these physical circumstances, and in that sense, it is not
irreformable. The history of the concept of motion provides a case in point: from
the Aristotelian desire for a goal, to the notion of motion as a velocity and a
transient indwelling force producing it (the impetus theory) to the motion of
Newtonian dynamics and thence to the motion described by relativity and
curved space-time. You might say that these are examples of theories of
motion and not descriptions of what we observe. In reply, it can be said that
what we observe depends on what we understand to be the case; and if we
understand motion to be the outcome of a desire, or the product of a force or
a free movement in curved space-time, then this is what we observe.'
This rejection of a privileged set of basic observational concepts
3
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considered as irreformable because received passively from the object, is
not to be taken as a rejection of criteria for testing hypotheses. For the
testing of a hypothesis requires only that there be a distinction between basic
non-hypothetical (call them `observational ') sentences and the sentence to
be tested. However, it is not necessary that the basic non-hypothetical
sentences be irreformably given in order that they might function in the
testing of an as yet undecided sentence.4 This problem, the
Basisproblematik, has a considerable literature and solutions range from the
conventionality supported by Poincaré, Carnap and Shefller5 where the
decision of the linguistic community is paramount, to a view like that of
Putnam' which claims that there is only one non-arbitrary basic framework.
My own view on the question of conventionality, its freedom and its
limitations, will be given in section VI.
V. The replacement of one framework by another in the same tradition
I wish to consider four different cases of relationships between
frameworks.
First, there is the case where different conceptual frameworks, which
use nevertheless the same vocabulary or linguistic tokens, range over some
common domain of facts where they are found to make different and
mutually inconsistent predictions. For example, classical thermodynamics
and statistical thermodynamics yield different results with regard to temperature
and entropy predictions. If for example in the domain of small temperature
fluctuations, those made by statistical thermodynamics are verified, as they
seem to be, statistical thermodynamics ought to replace classical
thermodynamics as the account of what is observed. Both theories cannot be
simultaneously held, if in the domain where the difference is significant, they
yield inconsistent results. This is a case of a framework being replaced by a
more accurate one, but one concerned with the same kinds of problems. The
analogue in philosophy would be the replacement of one conceptual frame-work
by another in the same tradition as its predecessor.
The question arises, can two different frameworks range over a common
domain of facts? For common facts imply common meanings, and common
meanings imply one common framework.
Two quite different cases might be considered. The first is where the second
framework contains a sub-framework which forms part of the original
framework. Whether such cases exist, I am not sure. But if such did exist, the
sub-framework common to the rival frameworks might provide the common
range of facts in question. A surer example than that of thermodynamics is that
of whether geodetic measurements with light rays obey a Euclidean or a non4
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Euclidean geometry. Here the criteria are angle measurements at the three
corners of a large geodetic triangle. Since the notion of the angle subtended by
two lines involves theoretically only the immediate neighbourhood of the point
of intersection where Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries coincide, both the
meaning and the operational criteria for such a concept should be the same in
both cases.
The second case supposes that there is no sub-framework in common
between the two frameworks. Since there are no meanings in common, there is
no description made in the original framework which remains meaning-invariant
under the transposition of frame-work. Does this imply that no common set of
facts bridges the transposition? Two kinds of facts can be distinguished: sign
facts and signified -facts. The former, while possessing their own descriptive
framework, function in a certain context as a signal or communications medium,
by means of which we infer the answers to a question formulated in the space of
signified-facts. For example, looking at a lightning flash (sign-fact), I infer that
the atmosphere has been ionized (signified-fact 1 formulated in conceptual
frame-work 1). Had I entertained, however, the alternative hypothesis that Zeus
was angry (signified-fact 2 formulated in conceptual framework 2), I might have
read the same sign-fact differently. In this case, the common range of facts
which remains invariant under the transpositions of (explanatory) framework is a
range of facts described (usually) in the common sense framework and playing
the role of sign to signified.'
VI. Incommensurable frameworks and multiple mutually exclusive horizons
The second case is where different conceptual frameworks, which use
nevertheless the same linguistic tokens, have no common domain of facts,
because the categorizations are incommensurable. The latter is the realm of
conventionality in theory and observation.
For example, one is presented with the problem of describing the
geometry of perceived obj ects within the context of everyday life. Two,
perhaps more, languages are available. One is the ordinary spatial language
to which we have become habituated, which is based upon a rule of
congruence (a rule for deciding when two lengths are equal) which involves
the transportation of rigid rulers. This is the language of carpenters,
architects and the man in the street. Its way of geometrizing the world has
been handed down to us by our classical past, and its product is the
Euclidean space of classical physics and everyday functional living. On the
other hand, with the consent of a sufficient public, we could adopt a
language meaningful, of course, only to that public, where the rule of length
congruence was based upon a binocular visual estimate under standardized
conditions. This alternative geometrization yields, as Luneburg has shown, 8
5
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with some simple assumptions and under certain restrictive conditions, a
Riemannian geometry of constant curvature.
The latter case can be illustrated by the space represented in postimpressionist painting, which is, I believe, deeply affected by a new awareness
of the anomalous (Riemannian?) structure of visual space. In this connection, a
mathematical analysis was made by the author of the visual forms which
ordinary rectilinear physical objects, like tables, chairs, floors, walls, ceilings
etc. would have in the perception of an observer habituated to constituting his
space by binocular visual comparisons.9 Among the conclusions of this analysis
were, for instance, that such an observer would notice the tilting of the floor
plane upwards towards the horizon, the bringing forward of distant objects, the
protruding of nearby objects which appear in inverse perspective and the
bending of lines in certain predictable ways. To people habituated to a Euclidean
interpretation of their experience, these anomalies inconsistent with the
conventional Euclidean geometrization of space would have but one name: `
perceptual illusions'. Some of these ` illusions ' have been noticed in the course
of experiments on human perception, and a fruitful field of experimentation is
here open to anyone who cares to undertake the work involved.
More interestingly, however, all the pecularities 1 have mentioned and
others predicted by the theory of a Riemannian visual space are found
represented in the paintings of Vincent Van Gogh and Paul Cezanne. These
painters, although they were not geometers, learnt to speak a new spatial
language, different from the conventional language of classical science—
the language of binocular visual geometry. This was a new linguistic
convention but it was not an arbitrary one, if my interpretation of Van Gogh
and Cézanne is correct. It was rooted in a new awareness of visual space
resulting in a new geometrization of space and consequently, a new
experience of geometrical relationships between objects.
Meaning, language and conceptual frameworks are, then, conventional
but not arbitrary, since they must conform to possible human experience.
There may be, however, no way of describing the untapped possibilities of
human experience, whether with reference to a past epoch or with respect to
the present. Actual experience may be our only guide. One is tempted to say
that a conceptual framework must conform to the facts. But, then, there are
no facts antecedent to human experience. Every conceptual framework
makes the facts it conforms to by establishing the relevant categories, even
though it cannot legislate which of these categories will be filled. In this
sense, it makes facts, but cannot make them by an arbitrary fiat. The
arbitrariness of Carnap's conventionalism is removed from this account of
conventionalism as is the opposite view of Putnam and others that claims
6
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conventionalism plays or should play no part in the formulation of scientific
truth.
To summarize: the truth of a conceptual framework is in relation to a
pattern of conditioned exploratory behavior, but it is not simply the pattern
of conditioned exploratory behavior, nor does this pattern uniquely, without
conventions, determine the meanings of the framework concepts. Moreover,
whether a community chooses to condition itself to one pattern of human
behavior or to another is to some extent a matter of choice: not absolutely,
however, since they must at least ensure the survival of the human species,
but many patterns of human exploratory behavior are in fact culturally
contingent.
The example I have taken is of two incommensurable geometrical
conceptual frameworks, Euclidean and Riemannian, each of which being a
possible form of the human experience of space. These two frameworks
cannot, however, be combined into one description without incoherence.
They are two separate incommensurable spatial descriptions, not different
aspects of one thing. The root of their incommensurability lies in this that
they are embodied in two mutually exclusive sets of human heuristic
behavior
I want to introduce the following terminology: 10
intentionality-structure: the heuristic or meaning-structure of a pattern of
human exploratory behavior: when formulated, the meaning is a set of basic
framework concepts: I am not supposing that there is a unique formulation
for every intentionality-structure.
horizon: the set of possible objective (intersubjective) facts attain-able by
and through a functioning intentionality-structure, equipped with a
conceptual framework.
language: the set of external tokens into which the facts belonging to the
horizon are mapped: the language pictures by being a kind of projection of a
horizon of human experience onto a domain of external signs: a language
then is the embodiment in external signs of a conceptual framework.
linguistic context: another name for an intentionality-structure in so far
as it is the necessary condition for the use of a language.
The two cases we have considered up to this are those of the replacement
of one horizon by another more adequate than the first but within, as it
were, the same tradition: and the synchronous existence of multiple though
7
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mutually exclusive horizons standing for a variety of valid projections of
human experience. These constitute different and incommensurable
traditions.
VII. Complementary frameworks and complementary horizons
A third case is that of the complementarity of horizons. Here my
paradigm is quantum mechanics. The word ' complementarity' is Bohr 's, but
I want to separate myself from Bohr ' s philosophy, as for example, this is
outlined in Aage Petersen's account.11 Quantum mechanics with its
complementary languages illustrates a peculiarity of a wide class of
context-dependent languages—that they are mutually exclusive yet not
absolutely so. They resist combination on the one hand, and on the other,
they can be combined within a broader more inclusive language, which,
how-ever, is not in a Boolean relation to the original languages, but stands
to them in the non-Boolean relation of a non-distributive lattice. This will
be explained below.
The paradigm case is precise position language L a and precise
momentum language Lb in quantum mechanics. Each corresponds to its own
measurement context—precise position language is the linguistic projection
of precise position-measurement-contexts, precise momentum language is
the linguistic projection of precise momentum-measurement-contexts. Bohr
and Heisenberg and most complementarity physicists claim that these languages
are subsets of the kinematical language of classical physics. That this is mistaken
was pointed out by Feyerabend12 and the present author. In a paper read at a
meeting of the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science, the author
showed that the position and momentum languages are subsets of a broader
quantum mechanical kinematical language Lab in which the space-time
description of any quantum system can be formulated, whether or not the system
is found in a precise position or precise momentum-measurementcontext. 13 The
author showed that La , Lb, Lab and their complements suitably defined constitute
an orthocomplemented non-distributive lattice of languages, La and Lb can then
be said to be complementary in L a b . This is not the same as what Bohr
meant, since Lab neither contains nor is contained by the kinematical language of
classical physics. It simply replaces it.
The relationships between the three languages L a, Lb and L ab can be illustrated
by means of an analogy taken from biology. Two isolated allopatric stable
populations A and B of the same species exist in different environments, say, on
either side of a broad impassable river. Each population has its own set and
distribution of genotypes, G a and Gb respectively. A Boolean union of the two
populations would be one where the distribution of the genotypes would be just
the set theoretic sum of the genotypes of the two populations. A Boolean union
8
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of two such populations if it makes scientific sense at all, makes sense only if the
geographical barrier between the two populations remains intact. But if the
geographical barrier is removed, say, by building a bridge across the river, each
population is able to invade the territory of the other. New selection pressures
arise, genes are exchanged, and possibly new hybrids are formed. The exchange
of genes, hybridization and natural selection work in the course of time to
produce a new steady-state distribution of genotypes Gab in the expanded
stabilized population AB, which now occupies the whole territory. Gab will be
quite different from a Boolean union of the two original distributions Ga and Gb.
The genotypes of populations A and B, even though presumably they all persist
among the genotypes of the united stabilized population AB, are in a nonBoolean relation to the latter. The non-Boolean relationships between Ga , Gb and
Gab constitute what is called a non-distributive lattice.
Returning to the languages L a of position and L b of momentum in
quantum mechanics, we can define complements L’a and L’b of L a and Lb
respectively in such a way that La , L b , L’ a , L’b , L ab and Lo (the
complement of L ab, constitute an orthocomplemented non-distributive lattice
of the kind sketched out in the diagram below:14

Diagram of the orthocomplemented.non-distributive lattice
of (Lo, L a, L’b, L’ a , Lb, Lab ).
The relationship represented by the arrow is a transitive reflexive relation
called `partial ordering'. Whenever any two elements Lx and Ly can be
connected by an arrow i.e. whenever Lx→Ly, then we say that L x implies Ly:
the partial ordering is spoken of as implication. Moreover, the least upper
bound (l.u.b.) and the greatest lower bound (g.l.b.) can be defined in the
9
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following way: L z is the l.u.b. of L x. and Ly if and only if both L x and L y
imply Lz , and Lz is the lowest such element in the diagram with that
property. Lw is the g.l.b. of L x and Ly if and only if Lw implies both L x and
L y, and Lw is the highest such element in the diagram with such a property.
The following notation is used:
for the l.u.b., L z = L x + L y; for the g.l.b., L w= L x x Ly.
From this it follows that:
L x → L ,y if and only if L x = L x + Ly and Ly= Lx + Ly. Moreover every
element of the lattice, Lx, has a unique complement represented by L’x with
the properties that:
L x + L’x = Lab , L x x L’x = Lo, and L’’x = Lx
The orthocomplemented lattice in the diagram is non-distributive since,
L a x (L’b + Lb ) = La , while
(La x L’b) + (La x Lb ) = L’b
Where, however, La ≠L’b
Consequently, the operation ‘x’ is not distributive over the operation
‘+’.
Tlis kind of lattice differs from a Boolean lattice where the basic lerations are
always distributive.15
The elements of the lattice are not descriptive kinematical sentences of
quantum mechanics, but a set of six distinct quantum mechanical languages, each
treated as an indivisible element of the lattice. The partial ordering ` → ' or
‘implication’ between two languages La and Ly is to be given the following
interpretation :
L x → Ly if and only if every sentence in L x is also a sentence of L y. The
l.u.b., then, of two languages L x and Ly is the smallest language L z such that Lx
→ L z and Ly → Lz. This corresponds to the most restricted situation where either
one or other language is appropriate. The g.l.b. of any two languages Lx and L y
is then the largest language Lw such that Lw → Lx and L w → Ly. T'his
corresponds to the most general situation where both languages are
simultaneously appropriate.
The lattice of six distinct languages can be re-interpreted as a logic for
propositions in a meta-context-language, a language that speaks about events
conditioned by, let us say, ‘complementary’ contexts. In this meta-context10
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language, the logical sum (`p or q') of two sentences p and q is mapped on the
1.u.b. of the two sentences (‘p + q'); the logical product ('p and q') is represented
by the g.l.b. (`p x q'); negation (`not-p') is complementation. The partial
ordering of p and q (`p → q') is implication. The correct locus for the nonclassical logic of quantum mechanics is, I have shown in the papers referred to,
this higher meta-linguistic level.16 The logic of the lower levels, contrary to the
received view, is or could be classical throughout.
A similar logical situation arises, for example, in the case of two such
dissimilar linguistic contexts as those of the Aristotelian tradition on the one
hand and of the Augustinian-Platonic tradition on the other when they met in
Aquinas during the Middle Ages. Each linguistic context in conceptual isolation,
excludes the other, in the sense that at best confusion and at worst (syntactic)
contradictions would arise if statements belonging to the two different traditions
were combined in one argument. Let La be Aristotelian language and Lb,
Augustinian-Platonic language. Aquinas combined both of these traditions, call
them A and B into a new linguistic context AB with its own language L ab. The
new language L ab contains both Aristotelian and Augustinian subsets La and Lb
but it transcends both by making a coherent but non-Boolean synthesis of them.
The language L ab of Thomas Aquinas contains La and L b in the way that
quantum mechanical kinematical language contains the two complementary
quantum mechanical languages of position and momentum. In this new
precise sense of complementarity, Aristotle and Augustine are
complementary to one another in Thomas. L ab is a language in equilibrium,
more or less, with the critical philosophical experience of a community of
Aristotelians, Augustinians and Thomists.
Other examples of pairs of complementary languages are those of
biophysics and biology, of structure and function, of essence and process, of
esthetic beauty and functional utility, etc.
What I have described as the synthesis of two complementary languages
may be thought of under certain circumstances as the outcome of a Hegelian
dialectic in a community polarized by the functioning of two mutually
antithetical linguistic contexts or traditions. If (La )0 denotes the language of
the original thesis, and (Lb )0 denotes the language of the original antithesis,
then one would expect that in the course of the dialectic (La ) 0 would be
replaced by La , a language in the same tradition as the first but more
adequate than it, and similarly that (Lb )0 would be replaced by L b, a
language in the same tradition as the first but more adequate than it, and
that the final outcome of the dialectic would be the non-Boolean synthesis
of L a and L b in Lab . It is the non-Boolean character of the eventual synthesis
that guarantees that the synthesis is richer than either of the partial
11
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languages L a and Lb or even both taken in mutual contextual isolation. The
possibility of extending the notion of a dialectic between two
complementary traditions to one involving three or more complementary or
mutually antithetical traditions is suggested by the fact that the relation of
forming part of an orthocomplemented non-distributive lattice is not
restricted to just a pair of complementary languages, but could involve three
or more.17
The value of the analysis I have just given over other proposals for the use of
a non-classical logic in quantum mechanics and elsewhere is manifold. Firstly,
the claim that the context-languages constitute an orthocomplemented nondistributive lattice is a precise, well-defined claim which is subject to falsifying
tests. Secondly, it enables classical logic to be retained, if there are good reasons
for retaining it, on the level of each of the related object languages, La, Lb and
the language of the synthetic context Lab . Non-classical logic need enter only
when complementary contexts are combined, and in this case, it functions solely
on the meta-linguistic level of a meta-context-language which is itself a part of
the philosophy of the languages concerned and does not affect the use of the
language! themselves. Thirdly, the account I have just roposed can be the
starting-point for many investigations in the philosophy and history of science
and in the metascience of science d philosophy. One suspects that within the
synthesis which is lug foreshadowed between analysis and phenomenology that
each of the old traditions will be shown to be complementary to the other in the
sense I have stipulated within the future synthesis. Finally there is the possibility
of constructing a theory of the development of frameworks on the basis of the
relationship between the concepts and usages in the complementary languages
and the new developed roles they play in the language of the synthetic context.
VIII. The Manifest and the Scientific Frameworks
The fourth case concerns the relationship between two kinds of
frameworks, that called ` the manifest framework ' in which we describe
objects by means of perceptual predicates referring to the contents of the
intuitions of color, continuous extension, solidity, etc. and the scientific
frameworks in which postulated and inferred entities play an explanatory
role. The question I want to raise is: which of the frameworks describes what
the physical world is really like? Which of Eddington's18 two tables is the
real table—the solid, continuous, colored table, or the discontinuous swarm
of agitated colorless molecules?
I am for the moment concerned with only two points : (i) assuming that
the scientific framework describes what is really the case, does this imply
that the descriptive predicates of the manifest framework are merely
appearances in the sense of phenomena? And (ii) is it plausible that the
12
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history of scientific frameworks is the history of a movement towards the
unique perfect scientific description of the physical world (towards a
Peircean framework)?
(i) I have elsewhere expounded my view that concepts articulate distinctions
made by a human subject within a patterned way of life and that consequently
every concept relates an object, directly or indirectly, to man who, as Dasein,
constitutes his World around him by his purposeful, exploratory activity. This
purposeful exploratory activity can relate the object to the subject in either of
two ways. Firstly, it may reveal an object in its direct relation to man's bodily
sensibility, his needs and his purposes. This is the horizon of things-to-subjectsfor-subjects and it includes the manifest framework. Secondly, it may reveal the
object in its relation to macroscopic instrumental contexts. These serve the dual
purpose of being physical relata with respect to the scientific description and of
producing signals which serve as a communications channel for the scientist
to read. What I have just described are the scientific horizons of things-toinstruments-for-subjects, where public sign-facts describable in the manifest
image become the media through which cognitive entry is made into the
new horizon of signified scientific facts.
On this account both the manifest and the scientific frameworks yield
true descriptions of what is the case, but in relation to different patterns of
heuristic behavior. Relative to the scientific horizon, the sign-fact which is
located in the manifest framework is one of the characteristic modes under
which the scientific-fact appears: in that sense, a sign-fact in the manifest
framework is not one of the realities of the scientific horizon, but the
appearance of a reality (in that horizon). It is not a mere appearance,
however, since within the horizon of the manifest framework, a horizon of
things-to-subjects-for-subjects, the sign-fact has its own reality.
But it might be argued that one and the same object (e.g. a table) cannot
have at one and the same time the opposing characteristics of continuity and
discontinuity, solidity and relative emptiness, color and absence of color, if
one (the scientific) set is noumenal, the other (the manifest) set must be
phenomenal. We should have to agree with the objection if each of the
opposing predicates referred to an absolute character of the object, i.e. to
the object not as related through a pattern of interactivity with its
environment. But since these predicates arise only within and in relation to
such a pattern of interactivity, they are not absolute characteristics of the
object but characteristics of the object-as-constituted by the subject within a
certain pattern of human heuristic behavior. To the extent that the behavior
pattern of a scientific investigation is different from the behavior pattern
which reveals the horizon of the manifest framework, we have no way of
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comparing the predicates of one frame with those of another.
(ii) Finally, is it plausible that scientific description is moving towards
the ideal of a unique, perfect and definitive description of the physical
world?
On the one hand, the doctrine of complementary frameworks expounded in
section VII shows how it is possible for rival frame-works to come together in a
synthesis which contains each and is larger than both. This renders plausible the
view that the outcome of a historical dialectic between complementary scientific
theories might well be cumulative, leading to successive syntheses in the sense
proposed in section VII, rather than to a discontinuous non-cumulative sequence
of historical `paradigms' or frameworks which seems to be Kuhn's reading of the
history of science."
On the other hand, the discussions of sections IV and VI strongly suggest two
things: (a) the contingency of human patterns of life, and (b) the conventional
character of the conceptual framework we use to give meaning to a pattern of
life considered as a means of exploring and so constituting a World. These
considerations render implausible the claim that science, cumulative and
progressive as it may be in the sense of the preceding paragraph, is moving
towards a unique and definitive goal independently of the path the h'story of
science takes to reach it. It would be difficult indeed to know how to go about
justifying this Spinozistic claim. Sellars who makes this claim scarcely attempts
to justify it: it is in the last analysis one of the basic options which define for a
man the meaning for him of a philosophical enterprise.
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